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                DUALISM IN THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TESTIMONY 
                                     AND THE ABILITY INTUITION 
 
                                                S. Orestis Palermos 
                                        The University of Edinburgh 
 
 
 
i) Introduction  
 
In her book, Learning From Words (2008), Jennifer Lackey extensively argues for 
what she calls a dualist account of testimonial knowledge. That is to say, testimonial 
justification or warrant is neither reducible to, nor completely independent of basic 
sources of knowledge such as sense perception, memory and inductive inference. 
Instead, Lackey prompts us to move beyond the heated debate between reductionism 
and non-reductionism and towards her dualist account, which, she claims, can 
accommodate both of these views. 
 Lackey, however, does not classify her account into any of the broader trends 
of contemporary epistemology, despite the fact that she (2007) has argued against 
virtue reliabilism through a counterexample of … testimonial knowledge, viz. the 
Morris case (2007, 352).1 Conversely, the aim of the present paper is to investigate 
whether Lackey’s astute analysis is in line with the ability intuition –i.e. the idea that 
knowledge must be the product of cognitive abilities— as it is captured by a virtue 
reliabilistic necessary condition on knowledge that has been recently put forward by 
Pritchard, namely COGAweak (2010c). 
     For this reason, I will first outline Lackey’s view and I will then consider the 
motivating ideas and most closely related aspects of COGAweak. Finally, having both 
views in mind, I will attempt a comparative analysis of them that will hopefully 
expose some interesting similarities, which, in virtue of coherence, could render both 
accounts mutually supportive and informative.   
                                                
1 I will here discuss the ‘Morris case’, as modified by Pritchard (2009, 68) (i.e. the ‘Jenny case’ as 
Pritchard describes it). Notice, though, that apart from the hero’s name, nothing else really changes.     
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ii) Dualism in the Epistemology of Testimony 
 
Early on in her book (2008, ch1 and ch2), contemplating on the process of testimonial 
exchange, Lackey rejects the “belief view of testimony” (BVT) according to which 
we learn from the speakers’ beliefs, not their statements. On the contrary, on Lackey’s 
view, although beliefs are usually involved in a testimonial exchange, we do not gain 
knowledge on their basis but, instead, on the basis of the speakers’ statements: 
The “process of communication via testimony does not involve a speaker transmitting 
her belief to a hearer along with the epistemic properties it possesses. […] Instead, a 
speaker offers a statement to a hearer, along with the epistemic properties it 
possesses, and a hearer forms the corresponding belief on the basis of understanding 
and accepting the statement in question” (Lackey 2008, 72). 
 
Although this is a very interesting claim with several ramifications such as that 
testimony can function as a generative epistemic source, its exposition is far beyond 
the scope of the present essay. Instead, granting the above points to Lackey, we shall 
move on to her analysis of the origins of testimonial justification/warrant. 
Lackey first considers reductionism according to which the epistemic status of 
testimony is ultimately reducible to sense perception, memory, and inductive 
inference. As Hume (1977, 75)—who is often regarded (quite possibly unjustly) as 
the best-known supporter of reductionism regarding the epistemology of testimony—
notes, “the reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived 
from any connexion, which we perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but 
because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them.”2 
     More precisely, reductionists ascribe to the ‘positive reasons’ thesis, according 
to which justification or warrant is attached to testimonial beliefs only by the presence 
of appropriate positive reasons on the part of the hearers, thereby assigning all of the 
epistemic burden on the hearers’ shoulders. Since these reasons cannot be testimonial 
(otherwise there would be circularity) they must depend on other epistemic sources 
that typically include sense perception, memory and inductive inference. Therefore, 
testimonial justification and warrant is ultimately reducible to the justification/warrant 
                                                
2  In a similar vein, Faulkner (2000, 587-8) claims that “it is doxastically irresponsible to accept 
testimony without some background belief in the testimony's credibility or truth”, and “an audience is 
justified in forming a testimonial belief if and only if he is justified in accepting the speaker's 
testimony.” Or, consider Fricker (1994, 149-50): “the hearer should be discriminating in her attitude to 
the speaker, in that she should be continually evaluating him for trustworthiness throughout their 
exchange, in the light of the evidence, or cues, available to her.”  
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of these basic epistemic sources. Having these considerations in mind, Lackey 
formulates reductionism thusly: 
 
Lackey’s Reductionism 
For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B believes that p with justification/warrant on 
the basis of A’s testimony if and only if:    
(R1) B believes that p on the basis of A’s testimony; 
(R2) B has sufficiently good non-testimonial positive reasons to accept A’s 
testimony. (Lackey 2008, 145) 
 
     However, Lackey claims that the possession of appropriately positive reasons 
does not necessarily guarantee to the hearer the reliability of the speaker's testimony.3 
Consider, for example, Max who has known Ethel for the last ten years, over the 
course of which, he has acquired excellent positive grounds for thinking that Ethel is a 
reliable source of testimony. Currently, however, Ethel is going through a personal 
crisis that no one knows about, and, so, in a state of distress, reports to Max that her 
purse has been stolen, even though she has no reason to think that this is the case. 
Ironically enough, however, and unbeknownst to Ethel, it turns out that her purse was 
in fact stolen when she was at the coffee shop, earlier that same day.    
    What this Gettier-case demonstrates, Lackey (2008, 152) explains, is that 
despite the fact that the hearer has excellent positive reasons for accepting the 
speaker’s testimony, the speaker acts “completely out of epistemic character”, 
delivering an unreliable report, which though it turns out to be true, prevents the 
hearer from acquiring knowledge. Therefore, as mentioned before, the possession of 
appropriately positive reasons does not necessarily guarantee to the hearer the 
reliability of the speaker's testimony and, so, Lackey concludes, reductionism is not 
an adequate account of testimonial knowledge.  
     Consequently, Lackey moves on to examine the adequacy of non-
reductionism according to which testimony is just as epistemically basic as sense 
perception, memory, and inductive inference. Such a view can be traced back to the 
work of Reid (1983, 281-2) according to which “the wise author of nature hath 
planted in the human mind a propensity to rely upon human testimony before we can 
get a reason for doing so.” So, on the non-reductionist view, acquiring testimonial 
knowledge does not require the possession of any positive reasons on the part of the 
hearer; instead, as Tyler Burge (1993, 467) explains, “a person is entitled to accept as 
                                                
3 Lackey supports her claim through the consideration of two examples, namely ‘Nested Speaker’ and 
‘Unnested Speaker’ (Lackey 2008, 148; 152). 
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true something that is presented as true and is intelligible to him, unless there are 
stronger reasons not to do so”. Or, consider Matthew Weiner (2003, 257) who, in a 
similar vein, holds that “we are justified in accepting anything that we are told unless 
there is positive evidence against doing so.”4 Crucially, notice the commonplace in all 
the aforementioned views; while the absence of any negative reasons is necessary for 
the acquisition of testimonially based knowledge, the presence of positive reasons is 
not. Put another way, non-reductionists hold that so long as there are no relevant 
undefeated defeaters, 5 hearers can acquire testimonially based knowledge merely on 
the basis of a speaker’s testimony, thereby seemingly shifting the entire epistemic 
burden from the hearer to the speaker.6 
     Accordingly, Lackey formulates her version of non-reductionism thusly: 
 
Lackey’s Non-Reductionism 
For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B knows that p on the basis of A’s testimony if 
and only if: 
 
(NR1)  B believes that p on the basis of the content of A’s testimony; 
(NR2) B has no undefeated (psychological or normative) defeaters for A’s 
testimony;  
(NR3) It is true that p. (Lackey 2008, 158) 
 
However, Lackey goes on to test non-reductionism against the ‘Incompetent Agent’ 
(158) where an unreliable speaker testifies to a hearer. But, the hearer possesses no 
relevant undefeated defeaters and so, according to non-reductionism, must ultimately 
accept the proffered defective statement as true. Therefore, Lackey argues, just as in 
the case of merely possessing positive reasons, the mere absence of negative ones 
does not guarantee to the hearer the reliability of the speaker’s testimony and, so, non-
reductionism is in need of the further condition: 
 
(NR4)  The speaker’s testimony is reliable or otherwise truth-conducive. 
                                                
4 In a similar spirit, Audi (1998, 142) claims that “gaining testimonially grounded knowledge normally 
requires only having no reason for doubt about the credibility of the attester.”  
5  It is here important to introduce the two relevant types of defeaters that could affect one’s acquisition 
of testimonial knowledge. First, there are psychological defeaters, which are beliefs or doubts that are 
had by the hearer and which indicate that the hearer’s beliefs are either false or unreliably formed. 
Notice that psychological defeaters are not necessarily true. Second, there are normative defeaters, 
which are doubts or beliefs that the hearer ought to have, and which indicate that the hearer’s beliefs 
are either false or unreliably formed. In other words, normative defeaters are beliefs or doubts that the 
hearer should have (despite whether or not the hearer does actually have them), given the presence of 
certain available evidence.   
6  I here say ‘seemingly’ because, as it will become apparent later on, to possess no undefeated 
defeaters against a testimonial report is actually a condition that requires a fairly active epistemic 
stance on the part of the hearer.  
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(Lackey 2008, 159) 
 
     Next, however, Lackey considers two counterexamples in which the receiver 
of testimony is either insensitive to the relevant undefeated defeaters—even though 
they are evidentially present to him—or oversensitive to them, thereby being, in both 
cases, unjustified/unwarranted in accepting the speaker’s testimony.7 Accordingly, 
Lackey suggests, we must ensure that the hearer in question has the capacity for and 
is appropriately sensitive to the relevant defeaters. Hence, non-reductionism must be 
supplemented by the further condition: 
 
(NR5)  The hearer is a reliable or properly functioning recipient of 
testimony. (Lackey 2008, 164) 
 
     Then again, Lackey thinks that all of the five conditions that have been so far 
proposed are inadequate. The reason is that the counterexample of the “Insular 
Community” (Lackey 2008, 164-5)—in which the hero happens to ask for directions 
the only reliable testifier in a city whose members always deceive the ‘outsiders’—
demonstrates the need that the environment wherein testimony is exchanged must be 
suitable for the reception of reliable testimony. Consequently, non-reductionism must 
be strengthened with one last condition: 
(NR6) The environment in which B receives A’s testimony is suitable for 
the reception of reliable testimony. (Lackey 2008, 167) 
 
 Finally, having formed non-reductionism along the lines of the above six 
conditions, Lackey goes on to test it against Sam, the hero of one last counterexample, 
namely ‘Alien’ (Lackey 2008, 168-9); Walking in the forest, Sam sees someone who 
looks like an alien dropping a book. Sam recovers the book and notices that it is 
written in what appears to be English and it looks like to what we on Earth would call 
a diary. By reading the first sentence of the book, Sam forms the corresponding belief 
that tigers have eaten some of the inhabitants of the author’s planet. In reality, the 
book is a diary written in English and it is true and reliably written in it that tigers 
have eaten the aliens. Sam is also a properly functioning recipient of testimony and he 
is situated in an environment that is suitable for the reception of reliable reports.  
     Now, despite the fact that all the above six conditions are satisfied, it seems 
implausible to accept that Sam gains knowledge in this case. The reason, Lackey 
                                                
7 Lackey refers to these two examples as ‘Good-Natured’ and ‘Compulsively Paranoid’. See (Lackey 
2008 160; 161). 
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explains, is that Sam holds no positive reasons on behalf of the speaker’s testimony; 
he knows nothing about aliens, he has no beliefs about their reliability as testifiers, he 
has no idea about the purpose of alien ‘diaries’, he has no common-sense alien-
psychological theory, he has no beliefs about the reliability of the author of this book 
and so on. In the absence of such positive reasons, Lackey suggests, the only rational 
choice for Sam is to withhold belief.  
     Overall, what the Alien counterexample purports to demonstrate is that in the 
absence of any positive reasons for the reliability of the speaker’s testimony, it is not 
rational for the hearer to accept the target testimony. Therefore, while reductionism 
as expressed through the positive reasons thesis is not a sufficient account of 
testimonial knowledge, it nevertheless seems to capture a necessary aspect of it. 
Therefore, Lackey proposes, we are in need of a dual account of testimonial 
knowledge that will involve both reductionist and non-reductionist conditions and 
which she formulates as follows: 
 
Lackey’s Dualism 
For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B knows (believes with justification/warrant) 
that p on the basis of A’s testimony only if: 
(D1)  B believes that p on the basis of the content of A’s testimony; 
(D2)  A’s testimony is reliable or otherwise truth conducive; 
(D3)  B is a reliable or properly working recipient of testimony;    
(D4)  The environment in which B receives A’s testimony is suitable for 
the reception of reliable testimony; 
(D5)  B has no undefeated (psychological or normative) defeaters for A’s 
testimony; 
(D6)  B has appropriate positive reasons for accepting A’s testimony. 
(Lackey 2008, 177-8) 
 
To properly appreciate the motivating idea of Lackey’s dualist account, remember 
that reductionism puts all of the epistemic responsibility on the hearer while non-
reductionism assigns the entire epistemic work to the speaker. On the contrary, the 
main idea that motivates Lackey’s dualist account is the realization that the epistemic 
burden must be distributed across both the speaker and the hearer. As Lackey vividly 
puts it, “it takes two to tango”, because “an adequate view of testimonial justification 
or warrant needs to recognize that the justification or warrant of a hearer’s belief has 
dual sources, being grounded in both the reliability of the speaker and the rationality 
of the hearer’s reasons for belief” (Lackey 2008, 177). 
     In addition, there are two interrelated clarifications that are in order here. First, 
notice that since the epistemic burden of testimonial justification/warrant is 
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distributed across both the speaker and the hearer, the demand for the acquisition of 
positive reasons on the part of the hearer is not as strong as reductionists would 
require it to be. That is to say, the ‘positive reasons’ condition (D6) is not meant as a 
sufficient condition for acquiring testimonial knowledge. Rather, positive reasons are 
only required in order to render the hearer’s acceptance of the speaker’s testimony 
“rational, or at least, not irrational” (Lackey 2008, 180).  
     And second, notice that even though it has been argued that having positive 
reasons for accepting one’s testimony requires from the hearer to have all kinds of 
knowledge about people, their areas of expertise and their psychological propensities, 
which knowledge most subjects lack, this is not an actual problem for dualism. 
Granted, to accept one’s testimony as true on merely positive reasons requires a great 
deal of relevant knowledge, which is implausible to assume that normal subjects have. 
But, requiring positive reasons that can make my acceptance of one’s testimony 
rational, or at least not irrational is a far less demanding requisite that can be satisfied 
in much simpler ways. In particular, Lackey provides three types of inductively based 
positive reasons that could allow normal subjects to identify reliable (or unreliable) 
testimony.8 
     The first type includes criteria for individuating epistemically reliable contexts 
and contextual features: 
 
“Specifically, even if B has not observed a general conformity of reports delivered in 
contexts of kind C and the truth, B may have observed the general conformity of 
reports delivered in contexts of kind C and the truth. So, if B believes that A’s report 
is delivered in a C-context, then this, combined with B’s inductive evidence regarding 
contexts of kind C, may give B an epistemically relevant positive reason for A’s 
testimony.” (Lackey 2008, 182)  
 
For example, one may more easily accept the reports proffered in an astronomy 
lecture or found in National Geographic than the reports made in an astrology lecture 
or found in the National Enquirer. Or, in a similar vein, one may more easily accept 
the report of a calm and coherent witness testifying a robbery a few blocks away than 
would accept the report of a confused person who smells alcohol.9 “Similar remarks 
can be made about countless other contextual factors such as facial expressions, eye 
                                                
8  Although the following types are originally meant for the provision of positive reasons for accepting 
one’s testimony, it is true that they can also be used equally well for the seemingly diametrically 
opposite process of coming up with undefeated defeaters for rejecting one’s testimony. 
9  In relation to the previous footnote, see how this second case, as Lackey herself also suggests, is best 
explained in terms of either the possession or absence of undefeated defeaters, rather than the presence 
of positive reasons (2008, 181).  
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contact, mannerisms, narrative voice and so on” (Lackey 2008, 182). 
     The second class of reasons pertains to criteria that can help us make 
distinctions between reports: 
 
“In particular, even if B has not observed a general conformity between A’s reports 
and the truth, B may have observed the general conformity of reports of kind R and 
the truth. Thus, if B believes that A’s report is an instance of kind R, this, combined 
with B’s inductive evidence regarding R-reports, may give B an epistemically 
relevant positive reason for A’s testimony.” (Lackey 2008, 182) 
 
For instance, one may uncritically accept one’s testimony of the time of the day, one’s 
name, what one ate for breakfast, while one may adopt a more critical stance towards 
one reporting about political matters, the achievements of one’s children, one’s sexual 
performance, UFO sightings, and so on.  
     Finally, the third kind of criteria that Lackey puts forward are meant to help 
the hearer to distinguish between epistemically reliable and unreliable speakers:  
 
“Specifically, even if B has not observed the general conformity between A’s reports 
and the truth, B may have observed the general conformity of speakers of kind S and 
the truth. Thus, if B believes that A is an S-speaker, then this combined with B’s 
inductive evidence regarding S-speakers, may give B an epistemically positive reason 
for A’s testimony.” (Lackey 2008, 183) 
 
Consider, for example, that when one tries to find one's way to a desired destination 
in an unfamiliar city, one may accept in a less hesitant manner the testimony of 
someone who seems to be a local passer-by than would accept the word of someone 
who looks like a tourist. 
     The upshot of the above considerations is that despite the arguments that point 
to the opposite direction, there is indeed a plethora of ways in which a hearer can 
render her acceptance of a speaker’s testimony rational or, at least, not irrational, in 
the way that the ‘positive reasons’ condition of dualism demands. 
     In summary, and before moving to the consideration of virtue reliabilism and 
COGAweak, since the process of acquiring information through testimony so as to 
form the corresponding beliefs is an interactive exchange between the hearer and the 
speaker, the relevant beliefs can only become justified/warranted by conditions that 
pertain to both parties of the said exchange. This realization has made Lackey go 
beyond the debate between reductionism and non-reductionism, thereby wedding 
these two views in a single dual account.  
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iii) The Ability Intuition, Virtue Reliabilism and COGAweak 
 
Having become familiar with Lackey’s dualism in the epistemology of testimony, let 
us now see how contemporary epistemologists have endorsed the ability intuition on 
knowledge. For doing so, we should consider the motivating ideas of virtue 
reliabilism and the subsequent thoughts that have led to the formulation of a closely 
related necessary condition on knowledge, namely COGAweak. 
     Virtue reliabilism is essentially a refinement of process reliabilism, where the 
latter is the view that knowledge is true belief that is the product of reliable belief-
forming processes where a reliable process is one that tends to result in true rather 
than false beliefs. Process reliabilism is an externalist approach to knowledge; 
contrary to the traditional account of knowledge as internally justified true belief, one 
needs not know by reflection alone that one’s beliefs are formed in a reliable fashion. 
So long as one employs a belief-forming process that has been deemed about as 
trustworthy on the basis of empirical investigation –or more broadly, in relation to 
one’s previous engagements with the external world— one is justified in holding the 
resulting beliefs.   
     However, one of the main problems facing process reliabilism is that it is too 
weak in the sense that it allows any reliable process to count as knowledge-conducive. 
Consider for instance, Temp.  
Temp10 
Temp’s job is to keep a record of the temperature in the room that he is in. He does 
this by consulting a thermometer on the wall. As it happens, this way of forming his 
beliefs about the temperature in the room will always result into a true belief. The 
reason for this, however, is not because the thermometer is working properly, since in 
fact it isn’t—it is fluctuating randomly within a given range. Crucially, however, 
there is someone hidden in the room next to the thermostat who, unbeknownst to 
Temp, makes sure that every time Temp consults the thermometer the temperature in 
the room is adjusted so that it corresponds to the reading on the thermometer. 
 
Obviously, the way in which Temp forms his beliefs is reliable. Accordingly, by the 
lights of process reliabilism, Temp can acquire knowledge in this way. As Pritchard 
explains, however, we cannot attribute knowledge to Temp because in cases of 
knowledge we want our beliefs to be responsive to the facts. On the contrary, in 
Temp’s case, the direction of fit is exactly the opposite; it is not Temp’s beliefs that 
                                                
10 (Pritchard 2009, 48) 
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agree with facts, but the other way around. Therefore, it has been argued that process 
reliabilism must be somehow strengthened so that it will ensure that one’s beliefs are 
formulated in a way that will guarantee their responsiveness to the facts. But how can 
one satisfy this demand? The analysis of what goes on in Temp’s case should be 
illuminating.  
     Although Temp’s beliefs ultimately turn out to be true, this is obviously not 
due to Temp’s cognitive agency. Temp does not employ any cognitive abilities and 
makes no efforts so as to ensure that his beliefs will correspond to the facts. Instead, 
on the basis of a randomly fluctuating thermometer, he uncritically and passively 
acquires false beliefs, which, fractions of time later, turn out to be true due to the 
hidden helper’s intervention. Therefore, what explains why Temp ultimately gets 
things right is an environmental feature (i.e. the hidden helper), which is completely 
irrelevant to his cognitive agency; had the hidden helper been absent, Temp would no 
more enjoy true beliefs. On the contrary, had Temp employed his cognitive abilities 
in order to form his beliefs, the problem would have been resolved. Had Temp felt it 
is cold, he would not believe that it is hot no matter the reading of the broken 
thermometer. So long as Temp forms his beliefs on the basis of his cognitive abilities, 
he ensures that they will be responsive to the facts, such that they will come out true, 
despite the absence or the presence of the hidden helper’s fortunate intervention.  
So we see that in cases of knowledge we want one’s true beliefs to be 
responsive to the facts, and the way to ensure this is by requiring that one’s true 
beliefs are the product of one’s cognitive abilities. Interestingly enough, and in close 
relation to the above considerations, Greco has claimed that “to say that someone 
knows is to say that his believing the truth can be credited to him. It is to say that the 
person got things right due to his own efforts and actions, rather than due to dumb 
luck, or blind chance, or something else.” (2003, 111). 
Noticeably, the general idea which all the above considerations are appealing 
to is that knowledge must be the product of cognitive abilities and is also known—
amongst contemporary epistemologists—as the ability intuition on knowledge.11 
Remarkably, it is exactly this idea when combined with process reliabilism that gives 
rise to virtue reliabilism. 
                                                
11 The idea that knowledge must be grounded in cognitive abilities can be traced back to the writings of 
such figures as Sosa (1988; 1993) and Plantinga (1993). For more recent approaches to the idea see 
Greco (1999; 2003; 2006) and Pritchard (2009; 2010a; 2010b; 2010c). 
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 In particular, Greco has proposed that not all belief-forming processes are 
knowledge-conducive; rather “it is those processes that have their bases in the stable 
and successful dispositions of the believer that are relevant for knowledge and 
justification.” (1999, 287) And he adds: “A belief p has a positive epistemic status for 
a person S just in case S’s believing p results from the stable and reliable dispositions 
that make up S’s cognitive character.” (1999, 287-8) On this view, one’s cognitive 
character consists of one’s cognitive faculties of the brain/CNS including, of course, 
one’s natural perceptual cognitive faculties, one’s memories and the overall doxastic 
system. In addition, it can also consist of acquired habits of thought, “acquired skills 
of perception and acquired methods of inquiry, including those involving highly 
specialized training or even advanced technology.” (Greco 1999, 19) Accordingly, 
virtue reliabilism is usually formulated as follows: 
 
Virtue Reliabilism 
S knows that p if and only if S’s reliable cognitive character is the most important 
necessary part of the total set of causal factors that give rise to S’s believing the truth 
regarding p.12  
  
 First, notice that virtue reliabilism can fare well with respect to the Temp case; 
it is not Temp’s cognitive character that is the most salient factor in the causal 
                                                
12 Greco calls his view ‘Agent Reliabilism’. I have here preferred this alternative name because as an 
anonymous reviewer has pointed out, Greco nowhere explicitly endorses such a strong formulation of 
the ability intuition on knowledge. Instead, Greco holds that S knows that p if and only if S’s reliable 
cognitive character is an important –but not necessarily the most important—necessary part of the total 
set of causal factors that give rise to S’s believing the truth regarding p (see Greco 1999, 287-8; 2004, 
123; 2010,12). His critics (Lackey 2007, Vaesen 2010) however, claim that in order for Greco to avoid 
the knowledge-undermining epistemic luck involved in Gettier problems (see Gettier 1963), he needs 
to endorse the strong formulation of the ability intuition as it has been cashed out above. The reason, 
they claim, is that in Gettier cases, one’s cognitive character remains an important necessary part in the 
causal explanation of how a person formed her true belief, even though she clearly lacks knowledge. 
For instance, in the case where a person justifiably believes that there is a sheep in the field because 
one sees a sheep-shaped rock and it also turns out that there is a real sheep behind the rock, one’s 
cognitive character is indeed an important factor in the causal explanation of why one came up with a 
true belief, because it is on the basis of one’s cognitive abilities that one actually formed the target 
belief which accidentally turned out to be true, as well. Accordingly, Greco’s critics object that in order 
to explain why this is not an instance of knowledge acquisition Greco must object that the person’s 
cognitive character is not the most salient feature in the explanation of how the person acquired her true 
belief; instead the most important factor is luck. And they go on to provide evidence that Greco does 
indeed endorse such a strong understanding of the ability intuition: “S’s cognitive character is not the 
most salient part [in such cases]” ((Greco 2003, 131, the emphasis is added) quoted in (Lackey 2007, 
348) and (Vaesen 2010, 6)). This, however, may simply be a misunderstanding because Greco seems to 
avoid this problem by elsewhere claiming that in Gettier cases one does not believe the truth because 
of one’s cognitive abilities: “In Gettier cases, S believes from an ability and S has a true belief, but the 
fact that S believes from an ability does not explain why S has a true belief” (Greco 2010). In Gettier 
cases, luck simply cancels out the salience of S’s cognitive character at arriving at truth, and so S’s 
cognitive character is not an important feature in the causal explanation of how one gets to the truth of 
the matter. Therefore, contrary to what his critics think, it seems that Greco does not need to endorse 
the strong version of the ability intuition on knowledge in order to avoid Gettier counterexamples. 
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explanation of how he believes the truth. Instead, it is the hidden helper’s 
intervention. Therefore, according to virtue reliabilism and our intuitions, knowledge 
cannot be gained in this way.  
     However, and in close relation to our discussion on testimony, Lackey (2007) 
has argued that virtue reliabilism is too strong to account for cases of testimonial 
knowledge. To see why, consider the following case:  
 
Jenny13  
Jenny gets off the train in an unfamiliar city and asks the first person that she meets 
for directions. The person that she asks is indeed knowledgeable about the area, and 
gives her directions. Jenny believes what she is told and goes on her way to her 
intended destination.  
    
Now, unless we want to deny a great amount of knowledge that we suppose we have, 
we must admit that Jenny gains knowledge in this way. However, Lackey (2007) has 
argued that given the way Jenny gains knowledge, her cognitive character has not 
much to do with the true-status of her belief. Instead, it is the informant’s cognitive 
character that is the most salient factor in the causal explanation of why Jenny 
believes the truth. So, according to virtue reliabilism, Jenny lacks knowledge that she 
in fact possesses.  
     As mentioned before, the upshot of the above considerations is that the Jenny 
counterexample shows virtue reliabilism to be too strong and that it must be somehow 
weakened. In fact, in an attempt to capture the spirit of the ability intuition on 
knowledge, Pritchard (2010c) has recently proposed along virtue reliabilistic lines a 
necessary condition on knowledge, viz. COGAweak, which can accommodate the 
Jenny case as well. Before quoting COGAweak, however, we should first take a look at 
what considerations might have led to it by investigating the Jenny case in some more 
detail.  
     First, as Pritchard explains, it is important to note that to say that Jenny gains 
knowledge in this way, we must read the example in such a way that Jenny is in an 
epistemically friendly environment—i.e., the city that Jenny visits had better not be 
renowned for its dishonest informants. Was that the case, we would not credit Jenny 
with knowledge. Second, notice that we presuppose some inclinations about Jenny’s 
cognitive character. We expect that Jenny can distinguish between potentially reliable 
and clearly unreliable informants; we do not expect that Jenny would be happy to ask 
                                                
13 (Pritchard 2009, 68). It is adapted from Lackey’s ‘Morris case’ (see Lackey 2007, 352) 
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just anybody. For example, we anticipate that she would not ask someone who clearly 
looked like a tourist (i.e. an unreliable informant). “Had the first person she met been 
obviously mad, or a stereotypical tourist, for example, then we would expect her to 
move on to the next prospective informant down the street” (Pritchard 2010a, 18). 
Moreover, we expect that she is able to distinguish between potentially reliable and 
clearly unreliable information and thereby that she would not believe whatever she 
was told, had it been obviously false (for instance to go past the city hall whereas, in 
fact, she is in a village). “Furthermore, if the manner in which the informant passed 
on the directions was clearly questionable—if the informant was vague, shifty, 
hostile, and evasive, say—then we would expect our hero to exercise due caution” 
(Pritchard 2010a, 18). Had Jenny not been responsive to these epistemologically 
relevant factors, we would not have normally attributed her with knowledge. We, 
therefore, see that it is not that Jenny’s cognitive character has nothing to do with her 
believing the truth; it is just that the informant’s role is more important. It is upon 
these considerations that Pritchard proposes COGAweak.14 
 
COGAweak 
If S knows that p, then S’s true belief that p is the product of a reliable belief-forming 
process, which is appropriately integrated within S’s cognitive character such that her 
cognitive success is to a significant degree creditable to her cognitive agency. 
(Pritchard 2010c, 5) 
 
Obviously, COGAweak can easily handle the Jenny case; although the cognitive 
success is not primarily creditable to Jenny—but to the stranger—Jenny, in so being 
responsive to the epistemically relevant factors, has the right sort of abilities and 
employs them in the right sort of way so as to appropriately integrate the stranger’s 
information within her cognitive character, in such a way that the cognitive success 
for believing the truth is significantly creditable to her cognitive agency.15 Therefore, 
according to COGAweak, Jenny can gain knowledge in this way.  
                                                
14  It should be here clarified that although the ‘Jenny case’ (initially put forward by Lackey as the 
‘Morris case’ (2007, 352)) was one of the main reasons for revising the strong version of virtue 
reliabilism (and consequently coming up with COGAweak), Lackey’s dualism in testimonial knowledge 
and Pritchard’s COGAweak have been separately elaborated. Obviously, Lackey’s account is only meant 
to account for testimonial knowledge, while COGAweak is meant to apply to any kind of knowledge. 
There is, then, no suspicion that COGAweak is ad hoc and it should be thought of as a quite encouraging 
point if it, indeed, turned out to be in accordance with Lackey’s detailed account of testimonial 
knowledge.  
15 Notice that the appropriate integration of information acquired by external sources within one’s 
cognitive character is itself a belief-forming process, which is reducible to more basic inductively and 
memory based belief-forming processes. Nevertheless, the said kind of belief-forming process seems to 
be critical even though it is usually a transparent one. 
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 Finally, before moving on to the next section, notice that what virtue 
reliabilism and COGAweak have in common is their attempt to analyze knowledge, or 
at least a necessary aspect of it—COGAweak is not a sufficient condition on 
knowledge—in terms of credit attributions. This is so because in trying to 
accommodate the ability intuition on knowledge, both views share another common 
idea: credit is usually attributable in cases of success through ability.16 However, 
notice the lenient demands of COGAweak regarding the creditability of the cognitive 
success to one’s self. In contrast to the strong version of virtue reliabilism where 
believing the truth must be primarily creditable to one’s cognitive character and 
thereby to one’s self, COGAweak loosens the required dependence of the cognitive 
success on one’s cognitive agency, thereby allowing credit to be attributable to other 
factors as well.17 Therefore, according to COGAweak, even though the most salient 
factor that explains Jenny’s cognitive success is the informant’s contribution, Jenny’s 
cognitive abilities render her cognitive agency significantly creditworthy, thereby 
allowing her to gain knowledge in this way. 
 
iv) Dualism in the Epistemology of Testimony and COGAweak 
 
To refresh our memory, every instance of testimony is an exchange between two 
parties. Accordingly, on Lackey’s view, the testimonial justification/warrant of the 
hearer’s true belief does not originate in its entirety from the part of either the hearer 
or the speaker. Instead, both the speaker and the hearer shoulder the epistemic burden: 
“a hearer's belief has dual sources, being grounded in both the reliability of the 
speaker and the rationality of the hearer’s reasons for belief.” (Lackey 2008, 177)  
                                                
16 A subtle difference between the two proposals, however, is that while Greco presents knowledge as 
true belief which is ‘of credit’, Pritchard insists on thinking about knowledge merely as ‘creditable’ 
true belief. These two notions are not the same. “For example, one’s cognitive success could be 
creditable to one’s cognitive agency without being at all of credit to one (perhaps the cognitive success 
is the result of an inquiry that one ought not to be pursuing, because, say, there are epistemically more 
desirable inquiries that one should be focusing instead” (Pritchard 2010a, en. 26). While this 
distinction is not important to the present discussion, it is of great significance with respect to the 
debate on the value of knowledge. If, as Greco claims, knowledge is true belief, which is ‘of credit’, 
this is because knowledge is an achievement. Since achievements are finally valuable, knowledge turns 
out to be finally valuable, as well. However, considering cases such as the one mentioned above, or 
mundane instances of knowledge such as perceptual beliefs, Pritchard claims that knowledge is not 
always an achievement and so not finally valuable either. For further discussion on this issue, see 
(Pritchard 2010b, §2.4). 
17 In relation to footnote 12, however, notice that Greco’s ‘Agent Reliabilism’ appears to be closer to 
COGAweak than to the strong version of virtue reliabilism with which COGAweak is here juxtaposed.  
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     Let us now proceed to a comparative analysis between Lackey’s dualism on 
the epistemology of testimony and COGAweak, in order to draw some interesting 
parallels that, in virtue of coherence, may render these two views mutually supportive 
and informative. For this reason I will first consider condition D4, then I will move on 
to D6 and D5, D3 and I will finish with D2. 
     To begin with, consider condition D4 according to which the environment in 
which B receives A’s testimony must be suitable for the reception of reliable 
testimony. The reason for which I take up this point first is that there is no straight 
reference to it in the formulation of COGAweak. Nevertheless, notice that Pritchard’s 
investigation of what goes wrong in the Jenny case (presented in the previous section) 
upon which he later forms COGAweak, begins with the point that it is important to note 
that to say that Jenny gains knowledge in that way, we must read the example in such 
a way that Jenny is in an epistemically friendly environment; it is not as if the city that 
Jenny visits is renowned for its dishonest informants. Was that the case then we 
would not attribute knowledge to Jenny. So we see that the problem posited by the 
knowledge undermining luck that attaches to a true belief when formed in an 
inappropriate environment goes far beyond unnoticed in the process of formulating 
COGAweak.18.And since COGAweak is only a necessary condition on knowledge—and 
should this become a pressing point—there is nothing preventing us from adding to it 
a supplementary clause that could rule out the lucky acquisition of true beliefs due to 
the environmental inappropriateness.19  
     Let us now turn to conditions D5 and D6 according to which the hearer must 
have no undefeated defeaters against the speaker’s testimony and the hearer must 
have appropriate positive reasons for the speaker’s testimony, respectively. The 
incentive for discussing these two conditions together is that they are jointly meant to 
                                                
18  In fact, Pritchard recognizes the problem posited by the knowledge undermining luck to be a central 
one. Accordingly, he elsewhere formulates a complete account of knowledge by combining COGAweak 
with an anti-luck condition on knowledge, namely the safety principle. Consider for example Anti-Luck 
Virtue Epistemology: S knows that p if and only if S’s safe belief that p is the product of her relevant 
cognitive abilities (such that her safe cognitive success is to a significant degree creditable to her 
cognitive agency (Pritchard, manuscript, 20). And again, in (Pritchard 2010a, 76) we can read: “ 
knowledge is safe belief that arises out of the reliable cognitive traits that make up one’s cognitive 
character, such that one’s cognitive success is to a significant degree creditable to one’s cognitive 
character”.   
19  In relation to the previous footnote, however, Lackey (2008, ch. 5, fn. 30) suggests that one could 
rule out the lucky acquisition of true belief in inappropriate environments in alternative ways such as 
with the inclusion of a metareliability condition. Although there might be some other alternatives as 
well (for instance Greco’s (2008) ‘subject-sensitive, interest-dependent contextualism’) their exposition 
is far beyond the scope of the present paper. 
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ensure the rational or, at least, not irrational, acceptance of the speaker’s testimony. 
Moreover, notice that the absence of any undefeated defeaters against and the 
possession of positive reasons for a testimonial report could be thought of as the two 
sides of the same coin. To see why, notice that both conditions require that one is 
aware of, able and supposed to detect any such reasons—should they become 
evidentially available—the only difference being that in order to acquire testimonial 
knowledge, in the end, no undefeated defeaters must remain while positive reasons 
must have been acquired. Importantly, however, both conditions require an active 
stance on the part of the hearer in the sense that she must be in a continuous lookout 
for satisfying them. I shall return to this point later on in the discussion of condition 
D3.  
     Meanwhile, we can return to COGAweak to see how conditions D5 and D6 can 
be seen through the lens of this account. First, notice that Pritchard clearly 
acknowledges that to say that Jenny gains knowledge in this way, we presuppose 
some natural inclinations about her cognitive character. We expect that Jenny can 
distinguish between potentially reliable and clearly unreliable informants; we do not 
expect that Jenny would be happy to ask just anybody. For example we anticipate that 
she would not ask someone who clearly looked like a tourist (i.e. an unreliable 
informant), or that she would not trust an informant that is vague, hostile or evasive. 
Moreover, we expect that she is able to distinguish between potentially reliable and 
clearly unreliable information and that she would therefore not believe whatever she 
was told, had it been obviously false. Had Jenny not been responsive to such 
epistemologically relevant factors then we would not have normally attributed her 
with knowledge. Interestingly, though, notice that Jenny's responsiveness to these 
epistemologically relevant factors can also be described in terms of the three types of 
inductively based positive and negative reasons that Lackey grants to epistemic agents 
for identifying reliable (or unreliable) instances of testimony; namely, (i) criteria for 
individuating epistemically reliable contexts and contextual features, (ii) criteria for 
distinguishing between reliable and unreliable reports and (iii) criteria for identifying 
epistemically reliable speakers.20     
                                                
20  Notice that, as Lackey herself admits, this list is not meant to be exhaustive as there could be further 
inductively based ways to distinguish between the reliability and unreliability of testimonial reports 
(2008, 181). Nevertheless, the identification of reliable reports should not be thought of as being 
exclusively based on inductive reasons, as it may often be the outcome of reasons that have to do with 
the agent’s memory; consider, for example, an agent assessing the coherence of information provided 
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     Therefore, we see that Jenny, in so being responsive to such epistemologically 
relevant factors, has the right sort of inductively based belief-forming processes and 
employs them in the right sort of way so as to appropriately integrate the information 
conveyed by the communicable content of the speaker’s act of communication within 
the rest of her cognitive character. What is of further import, however, is to notice that 
since one’s cognitive character has been described as consisting of one’s perceptual 
cognitive faculties, acquired habits of thought, but also of one’s memories and the 
entire doxastic system, we can see that to say that Jenny, in so being responsive to the 
epistemologically relevant factors, appropriately integrates the speaker’s information 
within her cognitive character is on a par with saying that Jenny renders rational or, at 
least, not irrational the acceptance of the speaker’s testimony. Because to rationally 
accept a piece of information is to say that this information does not conflict with the 
rest of one's beliefs, or that the process of acquiring it does not conflict with the rest 
of one’s doxastic attitudes. And this, one could argue, is exactly what Lackey 
intended for conditions D5 and D6 to do. 
     Let us now move on to the last condition that pertains to the hearer. D3 
demands that the hearer is a reliable or properly functioning recipient of testimony. 
As we have seen, the reason for which Lackey includes this condition is to rule out 
cases in which the recipient of testimony either has positive or negative reasons 
evidentially available to him but fails to properly appreciate them, or is oversensitive 
to them, thereby being viciously justified in accepting the speaker’s testimony. What 
must be further noticed, though, is that Lackey makes condition D3 subtler by adding 
the qualification that the hearer must be a reliable or properly functioning recipient of 
testimony in a substantial way. In particular, in her defense of her dualist view against 
the Infant/Child Objection, Lackey argues (2008, ch.7) that the only meaningful way 
for the ‘no undefeated defeaters’ condition (D5) to be satisfied is substantively, as 
opposed to trivially. To better understand this point, she prompts us to consider the 
following: “if we impose a no-φing condition on X then there is a crucial difference 
between what we might call trivial satisfaction and substantive satisfaction of such 
condition, a difference that depends on X’s capacity to φ. In particular, let us put forth 
the following: 
 
Trivial Satisfaction: If X does not φ merely because X does not have the capacity to 
                                                                                                                                      
by a proffered report with the rest of his/her doxastic system. 
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φ, then X has trivially satisfied the no-φing condition. 
Substantial Satisfaction: If X has the capacity to φ and does not φ, then X has 
substantively satisfied the no-φing condition.” (Lackey 2008, 198)21 
 
Having this crucial distinction in mind, Lackey goes on to explain that if φ is an 
epistemological or moral condition, then only in the second case is X 
epistemologically or morally praiseworthy for satisfying it (Lackey 2008, 198). 
Therefore, conditions D5 and D6 should be understood only as requiring a substantial 
satisfaction of themselves. And while it may be true that there is no obvious sense in 
which the ‘positive reasons’ thesis (D6) could be satisfied in a non-substantial way, 
this qualification is crucial for the ‘no undefeated defeaters’ condition, the point being 
that if the hearer does not have any undefeated defeaters because she is incapable of 
having any at all, then she is not praiseworthy (justified/ warranted) for accepting an 
otherwise reliable testimony and, therefore, she lacks knowledge.  
           Now, to see how this is connected to Pritchard’s account, recall that COGAweak 
reads that for S to know that p, S’s true belief must be the product of some reliable 
belief-forming process that is appropriately integrated within S’s cognitive character, 
such that the cognitive success is significantly creditable to S’s cognitive agency. 
However, since credit is attributed in cases of success through ability, this means that 
the employment and exercise of the belief-forming processes,22 via which S came to 
accept the speaker’s testimony, must signify that S has exhibited some effort for 
which his/her cognitive agency is praiseworthy, and so, believing the truth can be 
significantly credited to him. And this, in turn, is on a par with Lackey’s demand that 
the acquisition of positive reasons and the failure to detect any negative ones are 
conditions on testimonial knowledge that must be substantively satisfied.  
     Approaching to the end, let us turn to Lackey’s only condition that pertains to 
the speaker, namely D2: the speaker’s testimony must be reliable or otherwise truth-
conducive. First, we should concentrate on the epistemic burden distribution that the 
                                                
21  One of the examples that motivate Lackey’s view is the following: 
“For instance, one of the reasons it doesn't make sense to impose a “no-lying condition” on a 
chair is because chairs cannot lie. To say that a chair has satisfied such a condition merely 
because it hasn't lied, without taking into account whether the chair has the capacity to lie, 
trivializes what satisfaction of such a condition means. Of course, considerations of this sort 
apply to persons as well.” (Lackey 2008, 197) 
22  Remember that, in cases of testimonial knowledge, the belief-forming processes found in the 
formulation of COGAweak stand for the inductively and memory based positive and negative reasons 
that one may have for rationally, or at least not irrationally, accepting, or rejecting a speaker’s 
testimony (i.e. for appropriately integrating, or not, the speaker’s reports within the rest of one’s 
cognitive character).   
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inclusion of D2 entails. As it has been previously noted, Lackey’s dualism, contrary 
to reductionism and non-reductionism that only focus either on the hearer or the 
speaker, distributes the epistemic burden across both parties of the testimonial 
exchange. But how can COGAweak account for the dual origins of the epistemic 
justification/warrant? According to COGAweak, knowledge can be attributed to S only 
if the cognitive success of believing the truth can be significantly credited to S’s 
cognitive agency. Crucially, however, COGAweak denies that the cognitive success 
must be wholly attributed to the hearer’s cognitive agency thereby allowing, in cases 
of testimonial knowledge, for the rest of the credit to be, at least in part, attributed to 
the speaker’s epistemic effort. To see how this would work, it should be helpful to go 
back to the Jenny case; it is not that Jenny’s cognitive character has nothing to do 
with her believing the truth; it is just that the informant’s cognitive character is more 
important. Despite this fact, however, a significant part of the credit can be attributed 
to Jenny's cognitive agency for employing the right sort of belief-forming processes 
for rationally accepting the speaker’s words. At the same time, however, the rest of 
the credit can be, at least in part, attributed to the speaker’s cognitive agency for 
delivering a reliable report. So, we see that, in this way, COGAweak can accommodate 
the very essence of Lackey’s dualism in the epistemology of testimony, namely the 
epistemic burden distribution across both the speaker and the hearer.  
       
v) Conclusion 
 
By the lights of Lackey’s dualism in the epistemology of testimony and COGAweak, 
we can see that acquiring knowledge on the basis of information provided by 
testimonial reports is a belief-forming process that is neither reducible to nor entirely 
independent of more basic reliable belief-forming processes such as sense perception, 
memory and inductive inference. That is to say, while the rational acceptance of the 
information—not of the beliefs—conveyed by the content of the speaker’s act of 
communication is reducible to the hearer’s employment of further basic belief-
forming processes, the reliability of the speaker’s testimony is completely 
independent of them, entirely relying on the speaker’s epistemic responsibility. 
 Therefore, just as COGAweak allows, while the hearer’s cognitive success of 
believing the truth is significantly, though not primarily, creditable to her cognitive 
agency for employing the relevant belief-forming processes in order to rationally 
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accept the speaker’s report (i.e. to appropriately integrate it within her cognitive 
character), the rest of the credit should be attributed, at least in part, to the speaker’s 
cognitive agency for delivering reliable information. But, to rationally accept the 
speaker’s testimony through the satisfaction of conditions D5 and D6 is an effort that 
is not void of “all epistemic significance” (Lackey 2007). It is what renders the hearer 
entitled in accepting the speaker’s report. Put another way, despite Lackey’s initial 
estimations, it’s not the case that what explains how a hearer acquires knowledge on 
the basis of testimony has nothing of epistemic interest to do with her and nearly 
everything of epistemic interest to do with the speaker (2007, 352). On the contrary, 
while it may not be the most salient feature, the hearer’s role, just as COGAweak 
anticipates, appears to be a significant one.  
 What is more, notice the difficulties facing any of the alternative views on 
knowledge to accommodate Lackey’s dualist account of testimony. Any internalist 
condition on knowledge is going to be in trouble accounting for condition D2 (i.e. the 
speaker’s testimony must be reliable or otherwise truth conducive). That is, it is not at 
all obvious how one may, by reflection alone, account for the externally originated 
justification resulting from the speaker’s reliability.23 Accordingly, Lackey’s astute 
analysis of testimonial knowledge may only be accommodated by an externalist 
condition. However, a strong version of virtue reliabilism whereby the hearer’s 
cognitive success must be primarily creditable to the hearer’s cognitive agency is 
unable to do justice to the epistemic burden distribution across both the speaker and 
the hearer set forth by Lackey’s dualist account. In contrast, COGAweak has the means 
to explain the dual sources of justification in cases of testimonial knowledge by 
allowing the cognitive success to be significantly creditable to both parties of the said 
exchange.24 
     And to conclude, while more may remain to be said on the epistemology of 
testimony, hopefully, it has been shown how Lackey’s dualism and COGAweak may 
complement each other by demonstrating an intriguing symmetry, which, one could 
argue, renders these two views mutually supportive and informative. In view of that, 
we may also reasonably conclude that Lackey’s analysis of the epistemology of 
                                                
23 A similar point may as well be made with respect to conditions D5 and D6. Sometimes, the 
inductively based positive and negative reasons that Lackey grants to hearers for accepting or rejecting 
a speaker’s report may be implicit and not reflectively accessible to the hearer–at least not at the 
moment of implementation.  
24 Arguably, Greco’s ‘Agent Reliabilism’ may generate similar results (see also ft. 12 and 17).  
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testimony and the ability intuition on knowledge, once properly formulated in terms 
of credit attributions in a balanced way, appear to be in line.25 
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